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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND FEDERAL LICENSING
PROCEDURES: INVOKING EXEMPTION 7(F) TO PROTECT
EXAMINATION MATERIALS
Karl Gruss*
Abstract
The United States Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Milner v.
Department of the Navy shut the door on an expansive interpretation of one
of the nine enumerated exemptions to the public disclosure requirements
mandated under the Freedom of Information Act. No longer can federal
agencies seek cover behind the judicially crafted interpretation of
Exemption 2 known as the “High 2” that permitted agencies to withhold
documents from the public eye solely because disclosure of the information
contained therein could risk circumvention of an individual agency’s
regulations or statutes. However, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in
Milner hinted at the Court’s possible acceptance of an alternative option
available to federal agencies that previously employed the High 2 to rebuff
public requests for information. This Note focuses on federal agencies
involved in the licensing and certification of individuals in public safetysensitive positions—principally the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal
Aviation Administration—that prior to Milner either actively used or could
have used the High 2 exemption to protect information relating to
examination questions and answers used to evaluate license and certificate
applicants’ competencies. This Note first examines the rise of the High 2
interpretation through the circuit courts, its application by federal agencies,
and the Supreme Court decision sounding the High 2’s death knell. This
Note then argues that courts should embrace an interpretation of another
Freedom of Information Act exemption, Exemption 7(F), to permit federal
agencies involved in the licensing and certification of individuals in public
safety-sensitive positions to withhold information relating to examination
questions and answers.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine if individuals could fly aircraft or navigate commercial vessels
without first establishing the minimum competencies necessary to do so in
a skillful manner. The operation of aircraft and commercial vessels itself
entails inherent risks to public safety, even in the hands of experienced
controllers,1 let alone in the hands of novice members of the general
public. Given the potential for disastrous results if such activities went
unregulated, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S.
Coast Guard require that individuals demonstrate particular skills prior to
obtaining authorization to command certain aircraft and marine vessels,

1. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), roughly 80% of general
aviation aircraft fatalities are directly attributable to human error, with loss of control in flight
identified as the number one cause of fatal general aviation accidents during 2001–2011. Fact Sheet
– General Aviation Safety, FAA (Jun. 19, 2012), https://www.faasafety.gov/files/events/EA/
EA27/2013/EA2748590/FAA_Fact_Sheet_%E2%80%93_General_Aviation_Safety.pdf; see also
DOUGLAS A. WIEGMANN & SCOTT A. SHAPPELL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS
OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS USING THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM (HFACS) 1 (2001), available at http://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/
med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/2000s/media/0103.pdf (noting the slow rate of decline of aviation
accidents attributable to human error when compared to the rate of decline of accidents attributable
to mechanical failure).
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respectively.2
The FAA and the U.S. Coast Guard represent a category of federal
agencies, termed “mixed-function licensing agencies” in this Note,3
charged with the licensing and certification of individuals in public safetysensitive positions that adopt procedures to examine applicants’
qualifications.4 Examination techniques employed by these mixed-function
licensing agencies may include, among other methods, classroom-based
written examinations.5 These written examinations are designed to test
license applicants’ knowledge of concepts necessary to successfully
operate in environments where their duties and responsibilities directly
influence individuals’ security and welfare.6 Though mixed-function
licensing agencies publish study guides and other similar reference
materials, they often seek to protect the actual examination questions and
answers (examination Q&As) from public view to maintain the integrity of
the examination process.7
Shielding actual examination Q&As prior to the administration of a test
2. Depending on the type of aircraft an individual wishes to pilot, the FAA requires that the
license applicant pass both a written and practical examination. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3, .33–.39, .43
(2013); Recreational Pilot and Private Pilot Knowledge Tests, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/pilots/
become/knowledge (last visited June 16, 2014) (providing an overview of knowledge testing
procedures for recreational and private pilots); Recreational Pilot and Private Pilot Practical Tests,
FAA, http://www.faa.gov/pilots/become/practical (last visited June 16, 2014) (describing practical
testing requirements facing recreational and private pilots). In similar fashion, the Coast Guard
requires that individuals seeking to hold certain positions on commercial vessels obtain a Merchant
Mariner Credential (MMC) with endorsements detailing the scope of the credential’s authorization
by demonstrating proficiencies through a written examination. See 46 C.F.R §§ 10.201, .209 (2012)
(describing general procedures to apply for and obtain an MMC); 46 C.F.R. § 11.903 (listing
endorsements requiring passage of an examination prior to issuance); Examinations, U.S. COAST
GUARD, NAT’L MAR. CTR., http://www.uscg.mil/nmc/training/exams/default.asp (last visited June
16, 2014) (discussing the process of passing written examinations to obtain MMC endorsements).
3. The term is used to reflect the fact that these agencies tackle a broad range of functions
beyond the licensing and certification of private individuals. The term “mixed-function agency” has
been used by courts previously to describe agencies embracing both administrative and law
enforcement missions. See, e.g., Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d
1313, 1318–19 (D. Utah 2003) (determining that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation qualified as a
mixed-function agency because of the dual roles played by the agency in light of its statutory
authorization).
4. See supra note 2.
5. As part of the agency’s licensing process, the FAA administers Airman Knowledge Tests
tailored to the specific license individuals would like to obtain. Airman Knowledge Test Guides,
FAA, https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/test_guides (last visited June 16, 2014). The U.S.
Coast Guard likewise administers Deck and Engineering exams depending on the position a license
applicant wishes to hold. U.S. COAST GUARD, NAT’L MAR. CTR., GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
MERCHANT MARINER EXAMINATIONS (DECK & ENGINEERING GUIDE) 1, 2, 22, 54 (2011), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/nmc/training/pdfs/deck_and_engineering_guide.pdf.
6. See About Us, NAT’L MAR. CTR., U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/nmc/about_us/
default.asp (last visited June 16, 2014).
7. See discussion infra Part I.
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may seem natural.8 However, all federal agencies operate under the
watchful eye of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),9 which, at its
core, mandates that federal agencies provide public access to official
government records, subject to a set of nine limited exemptions.10 Mixedfunction licensing agencies often assemble large databases of examination
Q&As from which samples are pulled for each test.11 These examination
databases constitute official agency records.12 Therefore, mixed-function
licensing agencies intent on protecting examination Q&As from the public
eye must employ one of the nine enumerated FOIA exemptions.
Courts’ interpretations of FOIA’s Exemption 2, which excludes official
government documents “related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency” from the statute’s disclosure mandate,13 for years
enabled agencies to protect examination Q&As from publication.14 Based
on a broad view of the exemption established by the D.C. Circuit Court in
Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,15 courts in the
Second,16 Seventh,17 and Ninth Circuits18 embraced an interpretation of the
8. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the prevalence of rote learning in the examination
process and studies documenting the negative impact on information comprehension).
9. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
10. Id. § 552(b)(1)–(9); see also David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade
Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 157 (2007) (stating that, in light of
passage of FOIA, “[s]ecrecy [in a democratic government] is the exception, rather than the norm”).
11. See, e.g., Airman Knowledge Test Question Bank: Private Pilot, FAA (Jan. 13, 2014),
https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/test_questions/media/pvt.pdf (providing a glimpse into
the private pilot knowledge examination question bank); Frequently Asked Questions,
MYWRITTENEXAM.COM, http://www.mywrittenexam.com/mwe/faq (last visited June 16, 2014)
(explaining that the testing company has access to the over 900 questions that appear in the FAA’s
private pilot examination questions bank); U.S. COAST GUARD, NAT’L MAR. CTR., supra note 2
(providing access to deck and engineering examination questions); Dom Yanchunas, Coast Guard
to Resume Posting Full Archive of Mariner Exam Questions, PROF. MARINER (Aug. 28, 2012, 11:53
AM), http://www.professionalmariner.com/Web-Exclusive-2012/Coast-Guard-to-resume-postingfull-archive-of-mariner-exam-questions (detailing the U.S. Coast Guard’s policy of posting all
examination questions).
12. Title 5 of the U.S. Code does not specifically define what qualifies as an “agency record,”
but the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test stating that an (1) “agency record” must
consist of information created or obtained by the agency, and (2) the agency must control the
information at the time of the FOIA request. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S.
136, 144–45 (1989).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
14. See discussion infra Section II.C (providing a look at the U.S. Coast Guard’s response to
the Court’s narrowing of Exemption 2).
15. 670 F.2d 1051, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that “if a document for which disclosure
is sought meets the test of ‘predominant internality,’ and if disclosure significantly risks
circumvention of agency regulations or statutes, then Exemption 2 exempts the material from
mandatory disclosure”), overruled by Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
16. Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that “internal agency information
may be withheld . . . if the material is of public interest, and ‘the government demonstrates that
disclosure of the material would risk circumvention of lawful agency regulations’” (quoting Buffalo
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exemption that shielded “predominantly internal” documents whose
disclosure would “significantly risk[] circumvention of agency regulations
or statutes.”19 Referred to as the “High 2” exemption by courts following
the Crooker precedent,20 the exemption provided mixed-function licensing
agencies justification for protecting examination materials.21
The judicially crafted High 2 exemption crumbled in 2011 following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Milner v. Department of the Navy.22 In
Milner, the Court brought an end to the Crooker construction, holding that
a plain reading of FOIA does not permit such an expansive application of
the exemption.23 Beyond simply drawing the curtains on the High 2
concept, the Court’s decision signaled a return to a plain-language reading
of FOIA under which the nine exemptions “are ‘explicitly made exclusive’
and must be ‘narrowly construed.’”24
Against this backdrop, mixed-function licensing agencies no longer
enjoy access to the broad protections offered by the now-defunct High 2
exemption in efforts to protect licensing examination Q&As.25 But while
Milner may have foreclosed the use of the High 2 exemption, several
potential options have emerged to fill the void. The first method of
bypassing FOIA’s disclosure requirement entails securing codification of
the High 2 concept by amending the statute itself to either rewrite
Exemption 2 or create a new exemption embodying the language
articulated in the Crooker decision.26 The second method entails utilizing
Exemption 3, which permits agencies to exempt specific documents from
disclosure by statute.27
Evening News v. U.S. Border Patrol, 791 F. Supp. 386, 391 (W.D.N.Y. 1992))), overruled by
Milner, 131 S. Ct. 1259.
17. Kaganove v. EPA, 856 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1988) (embracing the Crooker
interpretation after embarking on its own review of FOIA’s legislative history), overruled by
Milner, 131 S. Ct. 1259.
18. Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
1259.
19. Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1073–74.
20. See Milner, 575 F.3d 959 passim.
21. See discussion infra Section II.C (providing a look at the Coast Guard’s response to the
Court’s narrowing of Exemption 2).
22. 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1271 (2011).
23. Id. (“Exemption 2, consistent with the plain meaning of the term ‘personnel rules and
practices,’ encompasses only records relating to issues of employee relations and human resources.”
(quoting 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(2) (2006))).
24. Id. at 1262 (citation omitted) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) and FBI v.
Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982)).
25. See infra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of such proposed language, see Daniel J. Metcalfe, Amending the FOIA:
Is it Time for a Real Exemption 10?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2012, at 16, 16–18.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (requiring a statute contain language that explicitly either “(i)
requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on
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Neither of these options, however, presents an ideal solution to the
problem that mixed-function licensing agencies face. Modification of
Exemption 2 or creation of an entirely new exemption codifying the High 2
standard fails to guarantee the Court will read the language as covering
federal licensing materials.28 Furthermore, reliance on a statutory
amendment to FOIA subjects agencies to shifting political winds.
Similarly, relying on individual statutory exclusions under Exemption 3
will force agencies to appeal to Congress on a case-by-case basis.29 Such
reliance creates an onerous burden on mixed-function licensing agencies
by removing their ability to efficiently protect information from public
disclosure in the face of evolving circumstances. At the same time,
congressional approval of an agency’s request for an individual statutory
exemption eliminates the ability of courts to examine whether the
government is justified in withholding information, potentially exposing
the use of the exemption to abuse.30
This Note argues that a third option, the utilization of Exemption 7(F),31
presents mixed-function licensing agencies a concrete means to lawfully
protect licensing examination materials from public disclosure. Part I
discusses why mixed-function licensing agencies seek to withhold
examination Q&As in the first place. Part II tracks FOIA’s development
and evolution, beginning with the statute’s basic premise that presupposes
information should be made public. Part II analyzes the development by
Congress of various qualifications to this premise through amendments to
the original FOIA, and how agencies successfully justified withholding
information under Exemption 2. Part III addresses how, in narrowing the
scope of longstanding interpretations of Exemption 2, the Supreme Court
opened the door for mixed-function licensing agencies to employ
Exemption 7(F) to protect information relating to the certification and
licensing of select individuals. This Note concludes that mixed-function
licensing agencies should protect the integrity of their competency
assessment tools by using Exemption 7(F) to continue to withhold
the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters
to be withheld” to qualify under this exemption).
28. The Court has not explicitly stated that the High 2 construction, if constituting a
permissible interpretation of Exemption 2’s scope, would cover mixed-function licensing agency
examination Q&As.
29. See supra note 27.
30. It is difficult to project how Congress may respond to individual requests for statutory
exemptions to FOIA’s public disclosure requirement, but it is possible to foresee agencies applying
to Congress for individual exemptions with full knowledge that the material the agencies seek to
withhold falls far outside that which FOIA’s nine enumerated exemptions are designed to protect.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (stating that FOIA’s disclosure mandate does not apply to
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual”).
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examination Q&As from public disclosure.
I. AGENCY DRIVE FOR THE PROTECTION OF EXAMINATION Q&AS
Rote learning undermines agencies’ competency assessment tools and
increases the public-safety risk of licensing unqualified individuals to
operate aircraft and commercial vessels. This drives mixed-function
licensing agencies to protect examination Q&As from public disclosure.
Based on government reports documenting competency concerns centering
on rote learning, this Part addresses the analytical basis for applying
Exemption 7(F) to agency examination Q&As.
A. Rote Learning and the Impact on Public Safety
Common sense appears to dictate that mixed-function licensing
agencies would seek to withhold examination Q&As from the public eye;
after all, providing test takers with not only all of the questions they will
encounter on an exam but also all of the answers runs counter to traditional
educational principles. But in the face of FOIA’s presupposition of public
disclosure32 and the risk of litigation posed by improperly invoking one of
the nine enumerated exemptions to the disclosure mandate,33 mixedfunction licensing agencies must establish a firmer ground to deny access
than a general appeal to common sense. Studies conducted on the effect of
rote learning or rote memorization, defined as “mechanical or unthinking
routine or repetition,”34 provide one form of empirical support for
protecting examination Q&As.35
It is critical to focus on what is at stake here. Mixed-function licensing
agencies are not concerned with providing individuals the go-ahead to
operate in a manner where their actions have the potential to affect only
themselves. Instead, mixed-function licensing agencies arm individuals
with licenses to man the controls of machines36 that in an instant can inflict
widespread damage on the public. It is in recognition of these licenses’
inherent power that mixed-function licensing agencies look to employ
exemptions to FOIA’s disclosure mandate in the examination of license
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra notes 59–60.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1084 (11th ed. 2011).
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. CASNER ET AL., NASA AMES RESEARCH CTR., FAA PILOT
KNOWLEDGE TESTS: LEARNING OR ROTE MEMORIZATION? 10–12 (2004), available at
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20040034190.pdf; KEIKO MOEBUS, MOEBUS
AVIATION CONSULTING, IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE PUBLICATION OF QUESTIONS OF THEORETICAL
EXAMINATIONS FOR PART 66 AND PART FCL § 1 (2009), available at http://www.easa.europa.eu/
rulemaking/docs/research/Final%20Report%20on%20publication%20assessment.pdf.
36. For example, the FAA grants individuals commercial and recreational private licenses and
the U.S. Coast Guard grants individuals commercial vessel licenses. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
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applicants.
B. The Federal Aviation Administration as a Mixed-Function
Licensing Agency Case Study
Access to an agency’s justification for withholding information from
the public is, in itself, largely covered by an exemption to FOIA protecting
intra-agency memorandums not available by law to a party other than
another agency in litigation.37 However, in response to concerns raised
over the potential impact on general aviation safety of rote memorization
versus “genuine conceptual understanding” due to misalignment in airman
testing, curriculum development, and industry standards,38 the FAA is
currently engaged in creating an agency working group tasked, in part, with
evaluating the agency’s test management practices.39 The FAA administers
airman knowledge tests as part of the agency’s airman certification
procedure.40 These examinations consist of objective, multiple-choice
questions covering a range of issues related to the certification the test
taker hopes to acquire,41 and the agency draws from a database of
questions and answers to assemble its exams.42 Prior to the FAA’s
investigation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA)43 and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)44 analyzed
the effectiveness of the FAA’s testing system on critical concept
comprehension.
To conduct its study, NASA reworded existing examination questions
from the FAA’s database, shuffled the answers, and created new figures for
problems that required test takers to examine diagrams in formulating
answers.45 NASA also created its own set of unique questions not available
37. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5) (2012) (“[FOIA’s disclosure mandate] does not apply to matters that
are . . . inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency . . . .”).
38. AIRMEN TESTING STANDARDS AND TRAINING WORKING GRP., A REPORT FROM THE AIRMEN
TESTING STANDARDS AND TRAINING WORKING GROUP TO THE AVIATION RULEMAKING ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 6 (2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/
documents/media/Airmen.Testing.Standards.Recommendation.Report.9.30.2013.PDF.
39. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee, New Task Assignment for the ARAC:
Establishment of Airman Certification System Working group, 79 Fed. Reg. 4800 (proposed Jan.
29, 2014). The working group, consisting of a wide range of stakeholders and tackling a variety of
issues related to the FAA’s airman certification system, must submit its findings no later than
December 31, 2015. Id.
40. Airman Knowledge Test Guides, supra note 5.
41. For an example of an examination offered by the FAA, see Airman Knowledge Test
Question Bank: Commercial Pilot, FAA (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/
testing/test_questions/media/com.pdf.
42. CASNER ET AL., supra note 35, at 1.
43. See generally id.
44. See generally MOEBUS, supra note 35.
45. CASNER ET AL., supra note 35, at 5–7.
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through the FAA’s examination database concerning required pilot
knowledge,46 and it used unaltered questions from the FAA’s database as a
control set.47 NASA administered the revised examination to forty-eight
private pilot applicants that recently completed the standard FAA
knowledge test to determine “if pilot applicants’ knowledge of the required
aeronautical knowledge was based on understanding, or on a more
superficial review of the questions appearing in the FAA [Q&A
database].”48 NASA found a statistically significant drop in the percentage
of questions answered correctly versus the control when figures diverging
from those in the FAA database were inserted into questions,49 and an even
greater drop when students faced entirely unique questions.50 Coupled with
data provided by the FAA indicating many test takers were able to
complete standard examinations in less time than it would take the average
person to read the question prompts,51 NASA ultimately concluded that, in
the case of the FAA, releasing examination Q&As in advance undermined
the viability of the examination process as a competency assessment tool.52
In similar fashion to the NASA study, the EASA study analyzed the
effects of rote learning on meaningful technical information
comprehension by examining the ability of university students to learn and
recall 136 Q&As from a flight training school examination question bank
in a twenty-four-hour period.53 On the first day of the study, the EASA
tested students on the exact same 136 questions provided in advance, along
with 136 reworded versions of those same questions.54 One week later, the
same students were tasked with memorizing another 136 questions, and
one day later were presented with an exam consisting of an exact copy of
those same questions, 136 reworded versions of those questions and the
same 272 questions from the previous week’s exam.55 The EASA found
that the average test taker could score above 75%, considered a passing
score, though the test takers scored marginally worse on the reworded
questions.56 Based on the study, the EASA concluded that aviation
examinations designed to test technical comprehension were susceptible to
rote learning and shallow understanding if the full set of examination
Q&As was provided in advance.57 The EASA report qualified its finding
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 2–4.
Id. at 10.
MOEBUS, supra note 35, § 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 8.
Id.
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by emphasizing that voluminous test banks can effectively mitigate the
shallow or nonexistent comprehension associated with rote learning in
many cases, though given enough time and preparation an exam taker
could still commit a substantial number of Q&As to memory without
grasping meaningful information.58
The current FAA working group investigation and the two studies cited
by the agency represent only a single example of the thought process
behind a mixed-function licensing agency’s effort to justify withholding
examination Q&As from the public eye. But the bottom line is that, despite
the burden of proof placed on federal agencies invoking an exemption to
FOIA59 and the potential consequences of improperly denying a citizen’s
request,60 at least some mixed-function licensing agencies feel that the
58. Id.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). The statute, in relevant part, states:
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the
complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the
agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court
shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency
records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section,
and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)–(G). The statute, in relevant part, states:
(E)(i) The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in
which the complainant has substantially prevailed.
(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, a complainant has substantially
prevailed if the complainant has obtained relief through either—
(I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent
decree; or
(II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the
complainant's claim is not insubstantial.
(F)(i) Whenever the court orders the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from the complainant and assesses against the United States
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs, and the court additionally issues
a written finding that the circumstances surrounding the withholding raise
questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect
to the withholding, the Special Counsel shall promptly initiate a proceeding to
determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee
who was primarily responsible for the withholding. The Special Counsel, after
investigation and consideration of the evidence submitted, shall submit his
findings and recommendations to the administrative authority of the agency
concerned and shall send copies of the findings and recommendations to the
officer or employee or his representative. The administrative authority shall take
the corrective action that the Special Counsel recommends.
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consequences of certifying unqualified individuals in public safetysensitive positions overshadow the litigation risk.61
II. OPERATING IN THE CONTEXT OF FOIA’S WATCHFUL EYE
Despite the public policy supporting mixed-function licensing agencies’
efforts to establish examination methods best suited to equip individuals
with critical competencies,62 membership-based interest groups
representing license applicants have vigorously challenged the withholding
of examination Q&As.63 Utilizing FOIA in attempts to compel agency
disclosure of this information,64 these groups have pressed mixed-function
licensing agencies into defensive postures. As FOIA places the burden on
federal agencies to justify the withholding of information from the public,65
mixed-function licensing agencies must reach beyond public policy and
invoke the limited exemptions to FOIA’s disclosure mandate.66
Although the case law is sparse when it comes to the application of
FOIA to mixed-function licensing agencies, courts have actively addressed
agencies’ use of the statute’s nine enumerated exemptions.67 The degree to
(ii) The Attorney General shall—
(I) notify the Special Counsel of each civil action described under the
first sentence of clause (i); and
(II) annually submit a report to Congress on the number of such civil
actions in the preceding year.
(iii) The Special Counsel shall annually submit a report to Congress on the
actions taken by the Special Counsel under clause (i).
(G) In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court, the district
court may punish for contempt the responsible employee, and in the case of a
uniformed service, the responsible member.
Id.
61. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
62. See supra Part I.
63. See infra notes 118–126.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (providing a general overview of the process to submit a request for
agency production of information subject to FOIA’s disclosure requirement).
65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9).
67. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011) (considering the U.S.
Navy’s invocation of FOIA Exemption 2 to withhold disclosure of data and maps revealing details
regarding explosive storage efforts in a Washington State naval base); John Doe Agency v. John
Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 147–51 (1989) (considering the validity of FOIA Exemption 7’s use by
petitioners, Defense Contract Audit Agency and FBI, to protect from public disclosure information
relating to an audit conducted by the government against a Department of Defense contractor
suspected of misallocating government funds); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 618 (1982)
(addressing “whether information contained in records compiled for law enforcement purposes
loses [FOIA Exemption 7] status when it is incorporated into records compiled for purposes other
than law enforcement”); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 216 (1978)
(analyzing the National Labor Relations Board’s appeal to Exemption 7(A) in withholding potential
witness statements prior to an unfair labor practice complaint hearing).
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which courts have provided federal agencies latitude in invoking the
exemptions, however, directly affects mixed-function licensing agencies’
comfort in turning to a given exemption. It also affects agencies’
confidence that they may avoid litigation if they decide to withhold
information despite an individual’s request for disclosure.68 This Part
specifically addresses how mixed-function licensing agencies have
navigated the FOIA landscape in light of key court decisions expanding
and subsequently contracting the scope of Exemption 2’s applicability.
A. FOIA and the Presupposition of Disclosure
Prior to the enactment of FOIA in 1966,69 members of the general
public relied on the public-information provisions contained in § 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to obtain “matters of official
record.”70 Constructed under “the theory that administrative operations and
procedures are public property which the general public, rather than a few
specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to know . . . with definiteness and
assurance,”71 § 3 nonetheless applied strict standards regarding who could
utilize the provisions.72 Only persons “properly and directly concerned”
with matters of the official record sought could hope to compel
disclosure.73 The statute further permitted agencies to withhold information
“for good cause found,” or if the agency determined such withholding was
in the “public interest.”74 Furthermore, even if an agency could submit no
ground for authority to withhold information, the APA provided the public
no remedy in the face of government opposition.75
Congress enacted FOIA in 1966 to eliminate agencies’ use of § 3 “as an
authority for withholding, rather than disclosing, information.”76 As the
House Committee on Government Operations stated in its report
accompanying FOIA, under § 3 of the APA, “the requirements for
publicity [were] so hedged with restrictions that [the law] has been cited as
basic statutory authority for 24 separate terms . . . which Federal agencies
have devised to stamp on administrative information they want to keep
68. See infra note 118–21 and accompanying text for an example of the U.S. Coast Guard’s
response to the Supreme Court’s rejection of the High 2 interpretation in terms of the agency’s
treatment of licensing examination Q&As.
69. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1967) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
70. Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1946) (recodified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
71. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 198 (1945).
72. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 40 (1965) (noting that under § 3, “any Government official can
under color of law withhold almost anything from any citizen”).
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 25 (1966).
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from public view.”77 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary likewise
pointed to the need to amend the APA to “establish a general philosophy of
full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly
delineated statutory language.”78
As part of the effort to codify this philosophy of transparency and
openness, Congress injected explicit language into FOIA providing private
citizens access to the courts for alleged unlawful withholdings.79 FOIA
places the burden on the agency to justify its withholding and mandates de
novo review in the courts to ensure “that the ultimate decision as to the
propriety of the agency’s action is made by the court and prevent it from
becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.”80
Addressing repeated challenges under FOIA since its inception, the Court
has maintained its focus on adjudicating cases in a manner that preserves
FOIA’s central purpose: “[T]o ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption
and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”81
The 1966 FOIA contained nine limited exemptions agencies could
employ to combat the disclosure presumption.82 In John Doe Agency v.
John Doe Corp., the Court recognized the legitimate interest posited by
Congress to withhold certain information from public view and “to reach a
workable balance between the right of the public to know and the need of
the Government to keep information in confidence to the extent necessary
without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.”83 Although modified in limited
fashion through statutory amendments, FOIA in its present state maintains
nine discrete disclosure exemptions that the Court maintains “are
‘explicitly made exclusive,’ and must be ‘narrowly construed.’”84
B. Rise of the High 2 Exemption
Exemption 2, the exemption that provided mixed-function licensing
agencies support to withhold documents relating to federal licensing
procedures,85 states in its current form that FOIA’s disclosure requirement
“does not apply to matters that are . . . related solely to the internal

77. Id. at 27.
78. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38 (1965).
79. Id. at 43.
80. Id.
81. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citations omitted).
82. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
83. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
89-1497, at 6 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011) (citations omitted) (quoting
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) and FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982)).
85. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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personnel rules and practices of an agency.”86 This seemingly innocuous
language spurred heated debate in courts over its scope, culminating in the
Supreme Court’s 2011 decision Milner v. Department of the Navy,
discussed further below, in which the Court laid to rest a burgeoning
circuit court split over the FOIA exemption’s breadth.87
The Court first provided agencies an opportunity to withhold licensing
examination materials under Exemption 2 in Department of the Air Force
v. Rose.88 In Rose, which centered on the petitioners’ calls for disclosure of
U.S. Air Force Academy honor and ethics hearing case summaries,89 the
Court stated that “where the situation is not one where disclosure may risk
circumvention of agency regulation, Exemption 2 is not applicable to
matters subject to such a genuine and significant public interest.”90
Viewing the Court’s language in Rose as permitting agencies to withhold
information beyond that relating to agencies’ internal personnel matters,91
the D.C. Circuit in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
crafted a two-part Exemption 2 application that guided courts’
interpretation of this FOIA disclosure exception for thirty years.92 The D.C.
Circuit in Crooker held that “if a document for which disclosure is sought
meets the test of ‘predominant internality,’ and if disclosure significantly
risks circumvention of agency regulations or statutes, then Exemption 2
exempts the material from mandatory disclosure.”93
As articulated in subsequent cases, the Crooker holding created a “High
2” and a “Low 2” exemption, with the Low 2 referring to agencies’ human
resources and employee-relations documents, and High 2 referring to
agency documents that could risk circumvention of the law if disclosed.94
The Second,95 Seventh,96 and Ninth97 Circuit Courts of Appeal adopted the

86. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2012).
87. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263.
88. 425 U.S. 352, 357, 369 (1976) (evaluating the Air Force’s claim that honors and ethics
hearings summaries constituted “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and thus qualified for
protection from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 6) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
89. Id. at 354–55.
90. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
91. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1066 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (noting that in reaching its decision in Rose, “the Supreme Court considered as substantial
the argument that Exemption 2 might be construed to cover internal agency materials where
disclosure might risk circumvention of the law”), overruled by Milner, 131 S. Ct. 1259.
92. Id. at 1074.
93. Id. (citing Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal,
J., concurring)).
94. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263.
95. Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1993).
96. Kaganove v. EPA, 856 F.2d 884, 888–89 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Crooker construction of Exemption 2, while the remaining courts of appeal
recognized only the Low 2 FOIA exemption.98
As a mixed-function licensing agency, the Coast Guard latched onto the
High 2 construction of Exemption 2,99 applying the standard to a swath of
information falling outside of the universally accepted Low 2
interpretation. The Coast Guard, in guidance materials provided to legal
officers involved in issues relating to FOIA, specifically stated that
examination Q&As qualified as information protectable from public
disclosure as High 2 material.100 Pointing to the agency’s duty to manage a
“competent” and “qualif[ied]” merchant marine,101 the Coast Guard as
recently as 2010, in an open letter to the public, reinforced the agency’s
belief that withholding examination Q&As from the public “protect[s] the
integrity of the exam and the Coast Guard’s regulation of licensed
mariners” and “ensure[s] that credentialed mariners are adequately skilled
and knowledgeable to protect the public.”102 The Coast Guard’s letter
further emphasized withholding the information would “facilitate an
examination of prospective mariners’ seamanship and maritime knowledge
rather than their knowledge of the questions and answers posted on the
website.”103 A FOIA Guide published by the Department of Justice
similarly recognized the general acceptance of the High 2 formulation’s
application to “agency testing or employee rating materials.”104
C. The High 2 Exemption’s Subsequent Fall
Over the course of 2003 and 2004, a Puget Sound, Washington resident
requested the U.S. Navy disclose documents related to facilities in the area

97. Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
1259.
98. See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263 (identifying the adoption of the High 2 construction by the
courts in Massey, Kaganove, and Milner).
99. See Slideshow, Mission Support Law, U.S. Coast Guard, Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA): General Overview 12 (2009) (emphasis added) available at http://www.uscg.mil/lsc/
docs/LSC_FOIA_Training_JUN09.pps (instructing that the High 2 interpretation could be applied
to information such as “guidelines for conducting investigations, security procedures, vulnerability
assessments, answers to exams [sic]”).
100. Id.
101. 46 C.F.R. § 10.101 (2013).
102. Press Release, D.C. Stalfort, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Changes to Mariner Examination
Questions Posting (July 6, 2010), http://www.uscg.mil/nmc/announcements/pdfs/removal_of_
mariner_exam_questions.pdf (providing the formal determination by U.S. Coast Guard Captain
D.C. Stalfort to withhold merchant mariner examination Q&As from the public).
103. Id.
104. Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004: Exemption 2, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(2004), http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption2.htm (citations omitted) (noting that disclosure of
these materials “has been found likely to result in harmful circumvention [of agency regulations or
statute]”).
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used to store explosives.105 The Navy invoked Exemption 2 in denying the
request, arguing that disclosure of the materials presented a threat to the
security of the base and its adjacent community.106 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed with the Navy’s determination that the requested
documents “would risk circumvention of the law” by drawing attention to
the base’s specific vulnerabilities that terrorists could target to wreak
havoc.107 Relying on the High 2 interpretation first formulated in Crooker,
the court granted the Navy summary judgment.108
Recognizing the circuit court split over Exemption 2 that emerged after
Crooker,109 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the
Low 2 interpretation constituted the only permissible interpretation of the
FOIA exemption.110 The Court noted that FOIA’s legislative history
supported a reading of Exemption 2 as applying to material more in line
with internal agency information such as the “use of parking facilities or
regulations of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the
like.”111 The Court argued that if it permitted continued reliance on the
High 2 standard, the Court “would ill-serve Congress’s purpose by
construing Exemption 2 to reauthorize the expansive withholding that
Congress wanted to halt.”112
But the Court in Milner signaled more than just the end of the High 2
interpretation: the Court’s majority opinion foreshadows a future
unwillingness to read elaborate exceptions into FOIA’s enumerated
exemptions.113 Relying on Webster’s and Random House dictionaries to
parse out the common meaning of Exemption 2’s key words,114 the Court
determined “the only way to arrive at High 2 is by taking a red pen to the
statute—‘cutting out some’ words and ‘pasting in others’ until little of the
actual provision remains.”115 Further, the Court acknowledged the presence
of contradictory legislative history that led the court in Crooker to read-in
the High 2, but explained that “clear statutory language” trumps “dueling
105. Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1263–64 (2011).
106. Id. at 1264.
107. Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 971 (9th Cir. 2009) (“There is no basis
to ‘suspect’ that the Navy has ulterior, political motives for denying the requested information. The
Navy has met its burden of describing how disclosure would risk circumvention of its regulations.”
(citation omitted) (quoting id. at 980 (Fletcher, J., dissenting))), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1259.
108. Id. at 971–72.
109. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263.
110. Id. at 1265.
111. Id. at 1262 (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 363 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. at 1266.
113. See id. (stating that the Court “will not . . . allow[] ambiguous legislative history to
muddy clear statutory language”).
114. Id. at 1264.
115. Id. at 1267 (citation omitted).
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committee reports.”116 Finding Exemption 2’s basic language unambiguous
in general usage, the Court determined legislative history provided
inadequate support for the High 2 construction.117
The Coast Guard’s August 2012 letter responding to the National
Mariners Association’s (NMA) FOIA request for publication of merchant
mariner examination Q&As illustrates the impact of the Court’s decision in
Milner.118 Following the Coast Guard’s decision in 2010 to remove
merchant mariner examination materials from the public sphere, the NMA,
a membership-based association representing the interests of merchant
mariners,119 formally requested the Coast Guard once again publish a
complete record of all examination Q&As.120 In its letter to the NMA two
years after the association’s FOIA request, the Coast Guard, in succinct
terms, cited to the decision in Milner and informed the NMA that it would
reinstate its formerly abandoned policy of publishing all examination
materials.121
In similar fashion to the action taken by the NMA in response to the
Coast Guard’s invocation of Exemption 2,122 the National Association of
Flight Instructors, dedicated to serving the interests of the flight instructor
community,123 challenged the FAA’s decision to inject new questions into
the agency’s airman knowledge examination database without informing
the public of the decision or releasing the new material.124 In response, the
FAA developed the Airman Testing Standards and Training Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in 2011, consisting of industry
representatives, to provide the FAA recommendations on how to improve
aviation safety.125 In its first report to the FAA, ARC urged the agency to
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. NMA Appeal Upheld on Exam Q&A Database, NEWSLETTER (NAT’L MARINERS ASS’N,
HOUMA, LA.), Aug. 2012, at 2–3, available at http://www.nationalmariners.us/images/Number_86_
August_2012.pdf.
119. About NMA, NAT’L MARINERS ASS’N, http://www.nationalmariners.us/about.html (last
visited June 16, 2014).
120. NMA Appeal Upheld on Exam Q&A Database, supra note 118, at 2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. NAFI – Who We Are, NAT’L ASS’N OF FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS, http://www.nafinet.org/who/
index.aspx (last visited June 16, 2014).
124. Letter from Jason Blair, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Flight Instructors, and Kristine
Hartzell, Manager of Regulatory Affairs, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass’n, to Van Kerns, Manager,
FAA Regulatory Support Div. (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nafinet.org/File/AOPA%20%20NAFI%20Knowledge%20Test%20Changes%20Letter%203-3-11.pdf.
125. AIRMAN TESTING STANDARDS AND TRAINING AVIATION RULEMAKING COMM., A REPORT
FROM THE AIRMAN TESTING STANDARDS AND TRAINING AVIATION RULEMAKING COMMITTEE TO THE
FAA: RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE AIRMAN KNOWLEDGE TEST CONTENT AND ITS PROCESSES
AND METHODOLOGIES FOR TRAINING AND TESTING app. C at C-1 to C-3 (2012), available at
http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/media/afs/airman_test_arc_final_rpt.pdf.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 10

1420

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

return its examination question bank to the public domain by the end of
2012, although it suggested that the agency examine over the course of a
three to five year period whether the question bank, in whole or in part,
could and should be lawfully withheld from public view.126
Given the pace with which federal agencies move, it is predictable that
the Court’s 2011 ruling in Milner will continue to work its way through
agencies’ legislative and regulatory offices. But in light of the Court’s
unequivocal stance on the employment of Exemption 2 to protect noninternal agency records from public view,127 it is unreasonable to believe a
mixed-function licensing agency would be so bold as to posit the courts
would permit an application of the exemption to licensing materials in the
future.
D. Refinement of Exemption 7
As the U.S. Department of Justice detailed in guidance provided to
federal agencies on the legal requirements imposed by FOIA,128 Exemption
7 initially enabled federal agencies to protect “investigatory files compiled
for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a
[private] party” from public disclosure.129 Designed to protect government
documents prepared for the purpose of prosecuting violators of federal
law,130 Exemption 7 experienced two major modifications following its
establishment in 1966: first in 1974131 and then again in 1986.132
Identifying widespread use of Exemption 7 as a blanket authorization to
withhold any information in an investigatory file regardless of the file’s
status,133 Congress amended the exemption in 1974 to permit protecting
the files only if the government could prove disclosure would result in one
of six explicit harms to an agency’s operations.134 Following Congress’s
amendment, properly invoking Exemption 7 required that an agency first
show the document at issue constituted “an investigatory record compiled
126. Id. at 31.
127. See supra notes 109–112.
128. Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2004),
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foi-act.htm.
129. Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004: Exemption 7, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(2004) [hereinafter DOJ Exemption 7], http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption7.htm (quoting the
Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012))).
130. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 44 (1966).
131. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552).
132. Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-48 to -50 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
133. DOJ Exemption 7, supra note 129 (citing Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.2d
1195, 1198–202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
134. Id. (citing Act of Nov. 21, 1974 § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563).
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for law enforcement purposes,” and then demonstrate how disclosure
would produce one of the six enumerated harms.135 Exemption 7(F), the
focus of this Note, specifically stated, at the time, that an agency must
demonstrate that production of the material “would . . . endanger the life or
physical safety of law enforcement personnel.”136
The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 once again revised
Exemption 7, and the Act’s language remains in force today.137
Recognizing fluctuating interpretations of FOIA’s ultimate purpose, the
discussion surrounding the application of Exemption 7 in advance of the
Reform Act ultimately boiled down “to the fundamental policy question
sought to be addressed by the [Freedom of Information Act]: How much
public disclosure of government information can the security of the Nation
reasonably permit?”138 Of significant relevance to mixed-function licensing
agencies, the Reform Act eliminated “investigatory” from the exemption
and inserted “or information.”139 The intent of this amendment, according
to Attorney General Edwin Meese III, as stated in a memorandum to
executive departments and agencies following the Reform Act’s passage,
was to “put an end to such troublesome distinctions and broaden the
potential sweep of the exemption’s coverage.”140 According to Attorney
General Meese:
Even records generated pursuant to routine agency activities
that could never be regarded as “investigatory” now qualify
for Exemption 7 protection where those activities involve a
law enforcement purpose. This includes records generated for
general law enforcement purposes that do not necessarily
relate to specific investigations. Records such as law
enforcement manuals, for example, which formerly were
found unqualified for Exemption 7 protection only because
they were not ‘investigatory’ in character, now should readily
satisfy the exemption’s threshold requirement.141
Additionally, the Act eliminated the need for agencies to conclusively
demonstrate disclosure “would” result in one of the enumerated harms,142
requiring instead a lesser showing that production “could” result in one of
135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622
(1982)).
136. Act of Nov. 21, 1974 § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563–64.
137. Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 to -49.
138. Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney
General’s Memorandum on the 1986 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (1987)
[hereinafter AG Meese’s Memorandum], http://www.justice.gov/oip/86agmemo.htm.
139. DOJ Exemption 7, supra note 129 (citing the Freedom of Information Reform Act of
1986 § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207–48).
140. AG Meese’s Memorandum, supra note 138.
141. Id. (citations omitted).
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 10

1422

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

the harms.143 Congress emphasized the changes were “designed ‘to ensure
that sensitive law enforcement information is protected under Exemption 7
regardless of the particular format or record in which [it] is
maintained.’”144 Addressing the qualification that the information relate to
“law enforcement purposes,”145 Attorney General Meese, in his
memorandum, stated that “[f]ederal agencies for which ‘[l]aw
enforcement, indeed, is often [only] one of . . . [the] agency’s proper
functions’ have been required to show that their records relate to ‘an
identifiable possible violation of law.’”146 Conversely, “the records of a
principal federal law enforcement agency, such as the FBI, have been
found to qualify simply by virtue of the primacy of the agency’s law
enforcement mission or because a rational connection can readily be shown
between the records’ compilation and the agency’s law enforcement
purpose.”147
Exemption 7(F) also experienced its own modification, transitioning
from a focus on the safety of law enforcement personnel to a focus on any
member of society.148 In its current form, Exemption 7(F) states that
federal agencies may withhold “records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such
law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected
to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”149 As Attorney
General Meese noted, “The expansion of this exemption’s protective scope
to encompass ‘any individual’ is obviously designed to ensure that no law
enforcement information that could endanger anyone if disclosed under the
FOIA should ever be required to be released.”150
III. APPLICATION OF EXEMPTION 7(F)
Courts have actively dissected Exemption 7(F)’s language over the
course of its evolution through today’s formulation, and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Milner sets the stage for future litigation over the
exemption’s use. Most notably, courts’ attention has focused on what

143. DOJ Exemption 7, supra note 129 (citation omitted).
144. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 98-221, at 23 (1983)).
145. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
146. AG Meese’s Memorandum, supra note 138 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Birch v. Postal Serv., 803 F.2d
1206, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
147. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474–76 (1st Cir. 1979) and
Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420–22).
148. Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-48 to -49.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
150. AG Meese’s Memorandum, supra note 138.
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“compiled,”151 “law enforcement purposes,”152 and “any individual”153
mean in the context of FOIA as a whole. This Part breaks down courts’
interpretations of these terms and how mixed-function licensing agencies
may utilize these analyses to lawfully withhold information relating to the
licensing and certification of individuals. Specifically, this Part breaks
down Exemption 7(F)’s language by its two primary prongs: the
requirement that information serve a “law enforcement” purpose, and the
requirement that disclosure could produce the specified harm.
A. Exemption 7(F)’s First Prong and Mixed-Function Agencies
Mixed-function agencies can satisfy the first prong of Exemption 7(F)
by showing that law enforcement, including preventative law enforcement,
was a significant reason for compiling the information that the agency
claims is exempt. The first subsection discusses the scope of the term “law
enforcement.” The second subsection discusses the Court’s interpretation
of the “compiled” requirement.
1. The Law Enforcement Hurdle
While courts have afforded agencies with principal criminal law
enforcement functions significant latitude to withhold documents under
Exemption 7,154 the judicial record is relatively sparse when it comes to the
exemption’s application by mixed-function agencies generally (not just
those involved in the licensing or certification of individuals). The
available record reveals, however, that courts understand Exemption 7’s
first prong as applying to entities beyond those traditionally viewed as law
enforcement agencies.155 As discussed in Living Rivers, Inc. v. United
States Bureau of Reclamation, mixed-function agencies are those that

151. See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 154–57 (1989) (refusing to
limit the term “compiled” to mean only those documents assembled originally for a law
enforcement purpose).
152. See, e.g., Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420–21 (establishing a two-part test to determine whether an
agency meets Exemption 7(F)’s law enforcement threshold).
153. See, e.g., ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting the
argument that Congress intended “any individual” under FOIA Exemption 7(F) to mean any person
without limit or specification to any degree), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 777
(2009).
154. Pratt, 673 F.2d at 419–21.
155. See, e.g., Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318–
20 (D. Utah 2003); Coastal Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 272 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (recognizing that even if the U.S. Customs Service “did not have a clear law
enforcement mandate,” the agency could still employ Exemption 7 if it could “show that the
[information subject to the FOIA request] was compiled for law enforcement purposes”).
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perform both administrative and law enforcement functions.156 Living
Rivers centered on a claim by an environmental group that the United
States Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) unlawfully invoked Exemption 7(F)
in refusing to disclose inundation maps detailing areas below the Hoover
Dam and Glen Canyon Dam.157 BOR claimed that Exemption 7(F)
justified withholding the maps because the agency compiled information
contained in the maps to prevent violations of the law,158 and disclosure of
the maps could endanger people living downstream from the dams.159
Noting that Congress provided the BOR “express ‘law enforcement
authority’ to ‘maintain law and order and protect persons and property
within Reclamation projects and on Reclamation lands,’”160 the court
found the maps were used and compiled under BOR’s statutory law
enforcement mandate,161 satisfying Exemption 7’s first prong. The court in
Coastal Delivery v. United States Customs Service likewise determined
that the U.S. Customs Service “has a clear law enforcement mandate,”162
and thus could invoke Exemption 7 to protect information regarding the
number of seaport merchandise examinations performed by the agency, so
long as the agency could satisfy the second prong of Exemption 7’s
analysis.163
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Milner further supported the idea
that mixed-function agencies could employ Exemption 7 to protect
information. In his opinion, Justice Alito remarked that “[t]he ordinary
understanding of law enforcement includes not just the investigation and
prosecution of offenses that have already been committed, but also
proactive steps designed to prevent criminal activity and to maintain
security.”164 If these functions failed to qualify as “‘law enforcement
purposes,’ then those charged with law enforcement responsibilities have
little chance of fulfilling their duty to preserve the peace,”165 Justice Alito
continued. Additionally, the majority in Milner left the question of whether
156. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (citation omitted). Living Rivers and Coastal
Delivery Corp. were specifically highlighted in the DOJ’s guidance on the scope of Exemption 7.
DOJ Exemption 7, supra note 129, at 4–5.
157. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1314, 1318 (noting that the BOR did not initially
invoke Exemption 7(F) to deny publication of the requested materials, but instead cited the
exception to FOIA’s disclosure requirement for the first time before the district court).
158. Id. at 1318–19.
159. Id. at 1315–16.
160. Id. at 1319 (quoting 43 U.S.C.A. § 373b(a)).
161. Id. at 1320.
162. Coastal Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 272 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
163. Id. at 960, 963. In this case, the U.S. Customs Service was successful in satisfying the
second prong of Exemption 7(E), which involves an enumerated harm not at issue in this Note.
164. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1272 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
165. Id.
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the Navy could protect its documents under Exemption 7(F) for the circuit
court on remand.166
Mixed-function licensing agencies such as the Coast Guard and FAA,
through their licensing and certification procedures, embrace the law
enforcement role Justice Alito emphatically emphasized in Milner.167
Mixed-function licensing agencies operate on the prevention end of the law
enforcement spectrum, ensuring that license applicants possess the
requisite skills to operate in a secure manner as required by Congress.168
The licensing of individuals in public safety-sensitive positions may not at
first blush appear to entail the unchallenged law enforcement missions
embraced by federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation169 or Drug Enforcement Administration,170 which direct a
substantial portion of their efforts to the investigation and prosecution of
suspected criminals. However, as Justice Alito explained, Congress, in
fashioning Exemption 7, understood it could limit the exemption’s
language to those specific activities.171 Indeed, “Congress’s decision to use
different language to trigger Exemption 7 confirms that the concept of ‘law
enforcement purposes’ sweeps in activities beyond investigation and
prosecution.”172
2. Meeting the Compiled Information Mandate
The fact that agencies may have collected the information used in the
licensing and certification process for multiple purposes, and not
exclusively for law enforcement purposes, does not disqualify Exemption
7’s application. The Court in John Doe Agency held that an agency may
still meet Exemption 7’s first prong “even though . . . documents were put
166. Id. at 1271 (majority opinion).
167. See supra notes 164166.
168. In terms of the U.S. Coast Guard, for example, Congress directs that “[t]he Secretary [in
charge of the agency overseeing the U.S. Coast Guard] may issue licenses in the following classes
to applicants found qualified as to age, character, habits of life, experience, professional
qualifications, and physical fitness.” 46 U.S.C. § 7101(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
169. The stated mission of the FBI is to “protect and defend the United States against terrorist
and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to
provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international
agencies and partners.” Quick Facts, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/quick-facts (last visited June 16, 2014).
170. The DEA states that its central mission “is to enforce the controlled substances laws and
regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system . . . those
organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or
distribution of controlled substances” in or destined for the United States. DEA Mission Statement,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/mission.shtml (last visited June 16,
2014).
171. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1272 (Alito, J., concurring) (“As Exemption 7’s subparagraphs
demonstrate, Congress knew how to refer to these narrower activities.”).
172. Id. at 1273 (citation omitted).
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together at an earlier time for a different purpose” than law enforcement.173
Justice Alito’s Milner concurrence further emphasized that Exemption 7’s
language does not require documents to “be compiled solely for law
enforcement purposes.”174 If “law enforcement purposes are a significant
reason for the compilation,” then information collected for multiple
purposes may be protected under the exemption.175
Understanding that the process of examining license applicants’
competencies prior to permitting those individuals to operate in public
safety-sensitive positions satisfies the “law enforcement purposes”
requirement under Exemption 7,176 the “compil[ing]” requirement is easily
satisfied through the creation of examination Q&As and collection in
defined databases.177 Mixed-function licensing agencies do not even need
to invoke John Doe Agency’s expanded interpretation of the term
“compiled,”178 as the compilation of the information is directly aimed at
carrying out the agencies’ law enforcement activities.
B. Exemption 7(F)’s Second Prong and Mixed-Function Agencies
Satisfying Exemption 7’s second prong hinges on demonstrating the
potentiality of one of the six harms enumerated in the statute,179 and
mixed-function licensing agencies can most easily invoke Exemption 7(F)
to protect information from public disclosure. As previously noted, the
Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the need for
agencies to prove disclosure of the information “would” cause one of the
six enumerated harms. Under the Reform Act, agencies need to prove only
that disclosure “could” produce the harm.180 Although courts recognized
that the Reform Act relaxed the burden facing agencies in the general
application of Exemption 7, the Second Circuit has interpreted the words
“any individual” contained in Exemption 7(F) as requiring an agency
invoking the exemption to point to a specific party that could be harmed by
disclosure. In ACLU v. Department of Defense, the court determined:
The phrase “any individual” in [E]xemption 7(F) may be
flexible, but is not vacuous. Considering, as we must, the
words in the statute, the structure of FOIA and its exemption
provisions, the chronology of amendments to those
173. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 154–55 (1989). Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Milner specifically highlights this holding by the Court. See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at
1273.
174. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1273.
175. Id.
176. See supra Subsection III.A.1.
177. See supra notes 11–12.
178. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
179. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)–(F) (2012).
180. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.
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provisions, and the requirement that FOIA exemptions be
narrowly construed, we cannot read the phrase to include
individuals identified solely as members of a group so large
that risks which are clearly speculative for any particular
individuals become reasonably foreseeable for the group.181
The court reasoned that, while Congress did not include a requirement that
specific individuals be identified by name, the statute requires that an
agency invoking Exemption 7(F) point to a somewhat defined group.182 An
agency must identify the subject of the suggested danger “with at least
reasonable specificity,” according to the court.183
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Milner glosses over the phrase, stating
that when security information is at issue, “it is not difficult to show that
disclosure may ‘endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.’”184
Justice Alito’s concurrence infers that in future Exemption 7(F) challenges,
the Court may treat an analysis of this portion of the statute as secondary to
the question of whether an agency satisfies the first prong of the test: that
the agency compiled the information for law enforcement purposes.185 In
light of the limited consideration this portion of Exemption 7 has received,
it seems appropriate to project that future court decisions focusing on
Exemption 7(F) will likely require that an agency demonstrate that
disclosure could endanger a subset of defined individuals, beyond just the
general public.
In determining the legitimacy of threats facing members of the public,
courts should display substantial deference to mixed-function licensing
agency leaders. Agency leaders are in the best position to project the
effects on public safety should license holders fail to maintain the critical
competencies necessary to effectively operate in hazardous conditions. As
the Department of Justice detailed in a guide regarding FOIA and the
statute’s nine limited exemptions,186 courts traditionally, and in the past
decade, have routinely accepted agencies’ appraisals of anticipated harm,
provided the agencies provide some form of demonstrable justification.187
It may prove insufficient in the eyes of a court for a mixed-function
licensing agency to merely assert that disclosure of examination Q&As will
result in cognizable harm to members of the public. If, however, the
agency provides at least minimal evidentiary support along with its
181. ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 67 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 130 U.S. 777 (2009).
182. Id. at 67–68.
183. Id. at 68.
184. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1272 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring).
185. See supra Section III.A.
186. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09.htm.
187. Id. at 657–58, available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7f.pdf.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 10

1428

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

assertion, the agency should receive clearance on this prong of the
Exemption 7(F) analysis.
CONCLUSION
In its creation of the Freedom of Information Act, Congress recognized
the need to balance the promotion of openness and transparency in the
federal government with the protection of government information that
may threaten public safety if disclosed. Recognizing the legislature’s intent
behind FOIA’s development, and in light of the Court’s rejection of the
High 2 FOIA exemption construction in Milner, mixed-function licensing
agencies should rely on Exemption 7(F) to protect information relating to
licensing and certification examination Q&As from the general public.
Agencies must promote meaningful competency measurement tools to
ensure that individuals in public safety-sensitive positions possess the
proficiencies necessary to effectively operate in conditions where the
public’s welfare is at stake. Invoking Exemption 7(F) comports with
mixed-function licensing agencies’ statutory and regulatory obligations. By
employing Exemption 7(F), mixed-function licensing agencies are not
grasping at straws to circumvent the Court’s abolishment of a previously
accepted justification to protect information from public disclosure; rather,
utilizing Exemption 7(F) constitutes a legitimate means to promote the
public welfare within the contours of judicial precedent.
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